



Marc Hauser’s research sits at the 
interface between evolutionary 
biology and cognitive neuroscience 
and is aimed at understanding 
the processes and consequences 
of cognitive evolution. 
Observations and experiments 
focus on human and nonhuman 
primates, incorporating methods 
and theoretical insights from 
behavioral ecology, infant cognitive 
development, evolutionary theory, 
cognitive neuroscience, biological 
anthropology, linguistics and 
philosophy. Current foci include: 
the nature of our moral judgments, 
the computations subserving our 
language faculty, the evolution of 
cooperation, economic decision 
making, conceptual representations 
in the domains of mathematics, 
space, language and music and 
animal communication. Hauser 
received a BS in Animal Behavior 
from Bucknell University and a 
PhD from UCLA. Currently, Hauser 
is a Harvard College Professor, 
and Professor in the Departments 
of Psychology, Organismic 
and Evolutionary Biology, and 
Biological Anthropology. He 
is the co-director of the Mind, 
Brain, and Behavior Program at 
Harvard, and adjunct Professor 
in the Graduate School. He is the 
recipient of a National Science 
Foundation Young Investigator 
Award, a Medal of Science from 
the College de France, and a 
Guggenheim Award. His work has 
frequently been featured in the New 
York Times, Boston Globe, Wall 
Street Journal, NPR, ABC News, 
National Geographic and several 
international newspapers and 
magazines. 
What turned you on to biology 
in the first place? Unlike many, 
who knew they would be biologists 
from early on, having discovered 
the beauty of beetles, the mysteries 
of flight or the thrill of predation, 
I was interested in sports, fiction 
and travel until I hit my freshman 
year of college. In that year, I met a 
professor by the name of Douglas 
Candland on the squash courts at Bucknell. We played, and in 
between sets, chatted about animal 
behavior and the emerging field 
of sociobiology. I took Candland’s 
animal behavior course in 1977, 
where we read and devoured E.O. 
Wilson’s major text. The questions 
were huge, the implications 
profound, and the empirical terrain 
wide open. I was sold. I dropped 
out of pre-med and dropped into 
animal behavior, enjoying wonderful 
courses and laboratory experiences 
with several primate species. 
What is the best advice you’ve 
been given? The best advice 
probably came from my father, a 
distinguished physicist in his day, 
and my post-doctoral advisor, 
Peter Marler. My father never 
explicitly gave me this advice, but 
advised by demonstration: never 
pigeonhole yourself into a particular 
set of problems or methods, and 
quit if you no longer delight in the 
questions. It was always clear to 
me that what he enjoyed most 
about science was its questions. 
This is a healthy attitude, because 
the results don’t always turn out 
the way you expected. If you have 
tasty questions, there will always 
be interesting places to move, 
independently of how the data 
emerge. Peter was also rather 
implicit in his advice, providing an 
exquisite example of how a well-
rounded scientist is a person of 
many talents, able to ask the right 
sorts of questions, develop clever 
experimental methods, articulate 
results in compelling and interesting 
ways, both aurally and verbally, and 
learn from others. Only once can 
I recall Peter giving me an explicit 
bit of advice, and this is when my 
impulsivity was getting the best of 
me. Peter kindly told me to slow 
down, reflect more, and publish 
less. I am sure I have disappointed 
along these lines, but the message 
has stayed with me.
My advice to the next generation 
would include the above mentioned 
ingredients, with one addition: keep 
an eye on adjacent disciplines, as 
a secret to success is the ability 
to abandon the current ship and 
join another. During my graduate 
years at UCLA, and then later in a 
post- doc at UC-Davis, many of us 
trained in behavioral ecology started 
worrying about its future, as well as our own. We had all witnessed 
the success of adopting the 
adaptationist’s perspective, thinking 
about costs and benefits and 
design features. But the success of 
this approach also seemed to lead 
to its own demise. In some sense, 
Darwin, Fisher, Hamilton, Williams, 
Trivers and Maynard Smith handed 
us rich theoretical predictions that 
turned out to be largely true! But 
now what? Most of my peers at the 
time began to move laterally, some 
picking up physiological techniques 
to explore the mechanisms both 
allowing for and constraining the 
adaptive trait; others pursued 
molecular technologies, using these 
to explore phylogenetic patterns; 
and yet others, myself included, 
looked to cognitive processes, 
to understand which aspects 
of human cognition are unique 
and which are shared with other 
species, and why such patterns 
evolved. Personally, I think the most 
exciting work in biology today sits at 
the fringes, with different disciplines 
clashing over theories, methods and 
interpretations. 
Do you have a scientific hero? 
When my youngest daughter was 
about three years old, I pulled a 
cheap trick on her, teaching her 
that whenever I asked “Who’s the 
man?”, she should reply “Darwin!” 
She does this quite well now. It is 
hard to imagine any living biologist 
not thinking that Darwin IS the man, 
and I am certainly no different. But 
I have a different hero, and for a 
slightly different set of reasons. 
The man is Noam Chomsky. Like 
Darwin, Chomsky raised a set 
of questions that literally turned 
around a discipline, and opened 
the door to several new disciplines. 
In Chomsky’s case, he turned 
around the field of linguistics, 
and gave birth to the cognitive 
sciences as we know them today. 
One of the ways in which he turned 
around linguistics was by noting 
that the study of language is like 
the study of any other part of the 
body, a proper problem of biology. 
Language, as a computational 
system, evolved, has distinctive 
features, can be studied with the 
tools of the natural sciences, and 
as such, raises profound questions 
about maturation, growth and 
knowledge. 
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Chomsky, even when I disagree, is 
his relentless capacity to challenge 
what seems obvious, and for many, 
what appear to be facts. As one 
example, consider his long-held 
belief that most philosophers and 
psychologists have misconstrued 
the problem of reference, thinking 
that our words actually pick out 
real world, identifiable objects, 
locations and events. In fact, 
so Chomsky has argued, the 
connection is extremely fuzzy, as 
becomes clear when we consider 
the city of London. Have you ever 
flown to London? Not really. You fly 
to Heathrow or Gatwick, and then 
drive to London. But is the sign that 
says “London city limits” the only 
cue that you are in London, and if 
someone moved the sign, would 
it feel any different? If the entire 
city was transported across the 
Thames, would it still be London? 
For many, this will appear silly, and 
outside of the biologist’s interests. 
But they would be wrong. What 
Chomsky is doing here, as he has 
so often done before, is challenge 
aspects of our understanding of 
the brain’s capacity to represent, 
including both the format and 
content of these representations. 
As he has often remarked, human 
brains may represent the world 
in fundamentally different ways 
from the brains of other animals. 
Whereas nonhuman animal 
representations are more closely 
tied to their sensory and perceptual 
experiences, human animals have 
evolved the capacity to create 
abstract representations, variables 
or symbols that cut across our 
direct experiences. 
Added on to Chomsky’s attacks 
on traditional ways of conceiving 
of our mental life, has been his 
dogged attempt to understand 
the nature of linguistic knowledge, 
from the descriptive principles 
that account for the mature 
speaker of a particular language, 
to the developmental toolkit that 
each child has been handed to 
acquire any of the world’s natural 
languages, and more. Underlying 
this search for understanding has 
been a remarkable ability to look 
critically at his own theories, and 
change them when they were 
insufficient to account for the 
evidence. His most recent attempts are radical, rejected by many, but 
with extraordinary implications — if 
true — for how the mind evolved. 
What is your greatest ambition? 
I suppose that I have two 
complementary goals. First, I hope 
that by the time I have retired, I will 
have asked a set of meaningful and 
novel questions that illuminate new 
ways of thinking about the human 
mind, its evolution, ontogeny, and 
break down as a result of insult. 
Second, I hope that my passion 
for asking these questions, and 
finding out what is (probably) true 
has infected many others, including 
the students I teach, and the 
public audiences that on occasion 
hear a lecture or interview. Seeing 
my students go on to have great 
careers is as thrilling as seeing 
my own work published, cited, 
discussed and rejected. 
What do you think are the big 
questions to be answered next 
in your field? For a couple of years 
now, I have been working with 
Chomsky on a project that attempts 
to move some of the central 
lessons of biology into the study of 
human thought. This exploration, 
only at its most primitive stage, 
starts with three points. First, when 
biologists look deeply into a system 
that is inherently variable, they often 
uncover a core set of generative 
mechanisms that is capable of 
creating such variation. Thus, the 
molecular revolution has led to the 
radical position that the variability 
in animal form is largely illusory, 
underpinned by evolutionarily 
ancient genetic mechanisms 
that can generate such variation, 
mediated by issues of timing and 
range of expression. Similarly, the 
Nobel laureate Niels Jerne claimed 
that the immune system is largely 
one that provides all the potentially 
necessary options for handling 
problems of immune challenges. 
Second, change rarely grows out of 
the invention of new mechanisms, 
but rather, out of the re-use of 
ancient mechanisms for new 
purposes or function. And third, 
when a generative system outputs 
variation, the variation is pruned 
back by environmental selection, 
fine-tuning the available options 
to meet the locally presented, and 
adaptive challenges. These lessons, we believe, are likely to apply to the 
brain. 
Thus, language, music and 
morality are massively variable 
cross-culturally, and we have 
had an obsession with such 
variation. But, if the lessons of 
biology apply more broadly, and it 
is hard to think of a good a priori 
reason why they shouldn’t, then 
underlying linguistic, musical and 
moral variation is a core set of 
mechanisms or principles that 
generates the variation, each 
culture having only a limited set of 
options that it can engage to prune 
back and select a local cultural 
variant. This possibility, if correct, 
sets up another profound problem. 
If there are conserved mechanisms 
for generating variation within a 
domain of knowledge such as 
language, music and morality, 
then these mechanisms had to 
interface in some way with novel 
sensory, perceptual, and learning 
mechanisms. Thus, for example, 
the human mind is endowed with 
a powerful combinatorial and 
hierarchical system that enables 
us to create meaningfully novel 
structures out of smaller parts. 
Thus, we take words and combine 
them in new ways to create 
sentences, take notes and combine 
them to create symphonies, and 
take actions and combine them 
to create morally permissible 
and forbidden events. But the 
combinatorial machinery, perhaps 
constant across each domain, has 
to interface with different kinds of 
representational entities: words, 
notes, and actions. How the brain 
does this is a deep mystery, but 
one that is presumably answerable 
given our increasing understanding 
of the brain’s codes. 
Should scientists have an 
obligation to society and the 
public at large? At least once a 
year, I feel great angst about my 
career. It is not that I doubt my 
work, or think that I have chosen 
the wrong professional path. 
Instead, I worry that my work 
is about as important as Greek 
translation is to our well being as a 
species. Lest I be misinterpreted, 
I have nothing against Greek 
translation. I see it as a great 
scholarly activity that should 
not vanish from our repertoire of 
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they were then dissected and 
samples of foot muscle from each 
individual freeze-dried and stored. 
From material taken from a sample 
of the 683 snail muscles preserved 
in this collection, the authors were 
able to assign a genotype for a 
mitochondrial marker amongst 
both the museum specimens and 
individuals from current captive 
and wild populations.
The researchers found five 
primary clades amongst the snails 
for this marker and were surprised 
to find that living snails, mostly 
from the mountains, could still be 
assigned to four of these clades 
despite the massive loss of lowland 
animals to the introduced predator. 
The researchers also describe the 
finding of two nominal species, 
still persisting at low altitudes in 19 
out of 69 valleys investigated, that 
formed the fifth distinctive clade.
The researchers conclude that 
the historical diversity of these 
snails (in terms of this marker 
at least) remains, though is in a 
perilous state. And they point out 
that four of the five main historical 
clades are due to the presence 
of genetically diverse mountain 
populations. “Conservation of the 
island’s remnant tree snail diversity 
is likely to require proactive 
maintenance of these threatened 





At first sight it looks like an 
ecological disaster: an isolated 
island group of animals under 
assault from an alien and ruthless 
predator. This seemed to be the 
plight and fate of tree snails in 
Tahiti. In 1974, a foreign predatory 
snail was introduced which 
rapidly eliminated their endemic 
prey. Thirty years on, three of the 
island’s eight endemic Partula 
species are officially extinct and 
a fourth exists only in captivity. 
But in a Correspondence reported 
on pages R502–R503 of this 
issue, Diarmaid Ó Foighil at the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
and colleagues at the International 
Partulid Conservation Project in 
Tahiti and the Zoological Society 
of London, shed a glimmer 
of conservation light on this 
otherwise bleak scene.
The researchers were able to 
get their results because one of 
the team, John Burch, collected 
extensive samples of all the 
nominal Tahitian Partula species, 
apart from one found exclusively 
in the mountains, four years before 
the predatory snail was introduced. 
The specimens were sent live to 
the University of Michigan where 
Refuge: the remote mountain terrain of Tahiti has proved a vital in preserving 
the genetic diversity of the island’s tree snails, decimated at lower levels by an 
 introduced predator. (Photo: Diarmaid Ó Foighil, University of Michigan.)endeavours, but should not be 
confused as crucial to our life on 
this planet. My colleagues and 
friends quickly point out that I am 
teaching people important things 
about the knowledge we have 
acquired through careful scientific 
exploration. Yeah, yeah. But the 
students I teach are already very 
well educated, and I often feel like 
the post-dinner entertainment, 
perhaps marginally better than MTV. 
But I do feel strongly that we 
have an obligation to the public, 
not only because they are footing 
the bill through taxes, but because 
no human being should be allowed 
to live in today’s world without 
an education in the sciences. 
Every bit of breaking news is 
more readily interpretable with a 
background in the sciences. As I 
am writing this essay on March 26, 
2007, the front page of the New 
York Times has these headlines: 
“Anna Nicole Smith’s Death is 
called ‘Accidental”, “Northern 
Ireland Rivals Reach Deal” and 
“Aged, Frail and Denied Care by 
Their Insurers”. The first makes a 
critical psychological distinction 
that bears on legal issues, 
specifically, the difference between 
intended and accidental actions 
with identical consequences; if 
you are a utilitarian, you might 
not care too much about this, 
but then again, recent findings 
in the neurosciences reveal 
critical circuitry in the brain that, 
when damaged, leads to greater 
utilitarian moral judgments. The 
second headline links to our 
evolved capacity to create in- group 
and out-group distinctions, but 
as the philosopher Peter Singer 
has noted, our equally powerful 
capacity to change who is ‘in’ and 
who is ‘out’. And the third headline 
speaks to the science of aging, 
the technologies now available for 
bio-engineering, and the ethical 
issues that accompany these hot 
button topics. As scientists, we 
must educate. We must step out of 
the university and into the public 
arena, taking every spare moment 
we have to ‘preach’ our passion. 
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